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Abstract—Election systems making use of eVoting machines are
becoming more prevalent. However, security issues do exist within
current products and proposed systems. One of these issues is
the occurrence of implementation-specific information leakage,
otherwise known as side-channel leakage. These have serious
implications for voter secrecy. An attack based on electromagnetic
leakage from Nedap voting machines has demonstrated that this
type of leakage is a relevant issue within eVoting. Therefore,
in this paper we present an analysis showing how common
components of eVoting machines may be vulnerable to side-
channel attacks. As side-channel leakage is also not sufficiently
addressed in the many available requirement documents for
eVoting systems, we also define requirements for side-channels
within the scope of eVoting machine security. Our proposal
involves the application of the Common Criteria method. These
requirements can be integrated into existing or future Protection
Profiles and Security Targets for eVoting systems.
Index Terms—electronic voting; security requirements; vote
secrecy
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of eVoting machines for legally binding elections
has been increasing worldwide, with eVoting machines cur-
rently in use in many countries such as Russia, Venezuela,
Brazil, and the US. Their purpose is to enhance the speed and
accuracy at which votes are counted and also to facilitate the
voting process for users. However, many questions have been
raised over security issues with the use of eVoting machines,
with some common makes and models having been criticised
and withdrawn from use, for instance in the Netherlands,
Germany, Ireland and some parts of the US.
One interesting security issue with eVoting machines has
been the exploitation of electromagnetic emanations from the
machine itself. This was demonstrated against Nedap and SDU
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines in the
Netherlands [1], where signals caused by the machine display
would allow an attacker to determine if a specific party was
voted for, just by using basic radio receiver equipment.
The attack exploited an implementation-specific type of
information leakage, or ”side-channel”, occurring during op-
eration of the eVoting machine. The goal of these types of
attacks is to break voter confidentiality, which has the effect of
disrupting a fundamental right of voters; the right to a secret
vote. By breaking secrecy of the vote, attackers can coerce
voters, damaging the democratic process.
However, vulnerabilities which allow these attacks to take
place are not taken into account in most design or evalua-
tion stages of eVoting machines. This is no surprise since
they are hardly addressed in requirements documents for
eVoting. Although general security requirements for eVoting
have been defined, for example in the Council of Europe
Recommendations [2], which state that the eVoting system
shall maintain individual privacy, these have essentially been
blanket recommendations, and do not possess the necessary
detail for the consideration of side-channel vulnerabilities.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of
side-channel leakage for eVoting systems, concentrating on
security vulnerabilities of polling station eVoting machines,
and to make recommendations for the mitigation of security
issues that would lead to vote confidentiality being compro-
mised. Such systems represent a special use-case and link
to passive plaintext information leakage, taking place during
normal machine operation, through the fact that human-system
interaction must be conducted in the clear, and using technolo-
gies that make vote selection as accessible as possible. By
taking common forms of eVoting machines and finding ways
that published side-channel attacks can be applied to them,
we highlight the possible existence of serious vulnerabilities
that need to be taken into account for the development and
implementation of secure eVoting systems. We also make
recommendations for the definition of security requirements
and the evaluation of eVoting machines so that their security
might be held to an open, accessible standard. Our main
recommendation takes the form of following the Common Cri-
teria methodology for defining requirements within the scope
of assumptions, threats and objectives, and then matching these
to predefined Security Functional Requirements. In this paper
this is achieved by demonstrating how information on practical
side-channel attacks can be taken from the available literature
and used to formulate requirements with an example outlin-
ing a Security Functional Requirement for machine display
leakage and attacker distance within a controlled environment.
Such a requirement could form part of a Protection Profile
or Security Target for an eVoting machine, and satisfy our
requirement for openness and accessibility.
In Section II, previous publications addressing the issue
of side-channels in eVoting will be discussed in relation to
our own contribution with this paper. In Section III, a short
overview of the development of side-channel cryptanalysis
will be given, going through the principles of attacks. After
this, a highly relevant class of side-channel will be discussed;
compromising emanations, which take the form of plaintext
information leakage. In Section IV the relevance of these
different types of side-channel attacks to different types of
eVoting systems will be covered. In Section V, we will provide
an overview of the requirements for a successful attack exploit-
ing compromising emanations and examine countermeasures.
In Section VI, we will outline how security requirements
addressing side-channel vulnerabilities can be semi-formally
defined through the use of the Common Criteria method-
ology, presenting an example requirement using the same
methodology. Finally, in Section VII, our contributions will
be summarised and suggestions for future work will be given.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss related work both regarding
existing requirement documents as well as regarding previ-
ously performed side-channel evaluations of existing eVoting
systems.
A. Requirement documents
The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines - Volume 1 [3],
designed to act as a best practice guide for the design and
implementation of eVoting systems after the Help America
Vote Act, makes some small mention, in Section 3.2.3.1,
of information leakage from headphones that are too loud,
which are used to relay sight-disabled voters’ choices back to
them. Also mentioned, in Section 4.1.2.9, is the requirement
for machines not to give out electromagnetic emanations, in
accordance with the FCC’s Rules and Regulations; Part 15,
for Class B devices. However, this was primarily designed
to prevent electronic devices from giving out electromagnetic
interference that might disturb other electronic equipment,
or interfere with the correct operation of the device itself,
and does not take into account the possibility of the signals
containing leaked information. Note, this type of requirement
is also mentioned in other requirement catalogues like in
[4]. While the second section, 4.1.2.9, does not address side-
channels that might break the secrecy of the vote, the first
section, 3.2.3.1, does and will be taken into account when
identifying potential sources of information leakage.
There has also been a general mention of side-channel
resistance in security requirements for eVoting machines [5],
which defines a threat to eVoting machine secrecy during
the vote casting stage as an ”intruder in or close by the
polling station sees, hears or measures information provided
by the voting process in order to compromise secrecy of the
vote”. The corresponding security objective requires that the
eVoting machine shall not leak any information about the
voting process, apart from that needed for other necessary
functions, and that the eVoting machine ”shall prevent any
emissions which might endanger the secrecy of the vote”,
including acoustic and radio emissions, and power analysis.
While the author provides some examples, this list is not
complete nor very detailed regarding which components of
the eVoting system might cause the emission.
B. Side-channel evaluations of eVoting systems
Emission tests of the Digital Voting Pen, proposed for use in
the Hamburg city elections, has been executed by Cambridge
University [6]. The test found that while some signals were
emitted, one of these being characteristic of a video signal,
no distinct information-bearing signal could be found. The
author mentions in his report that the emissions test was
not conclusive and that within 30 centimetres there is the
potential for a compromising emanation to be found. This
shows that distance is a relevant parameter when defining
security requirements, which will be taken into account in our
considerations. While the analysis of the Digital Voting Pen
only looked at the pen itself, not taking into account other
aspects of its implementation, such as being used with the
docking station and connected via USB connection to a PC,
both aspects of how it was actually used, we recommend in our
requirement definition to take any component of an eVoting
system into account.
The Nedap voting machines previously used in Germany
underwent an emissions test carried out by the Physikalisch-
Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) [7]. The authors of this paper
mention that besides distance being a factor, the quality of
the equipment and environmental factors (e.g. radiation and
reflection free test environments which might not be realistic
in polling stations) are also important. Furthermore, the fact
that the PTB executed their test again after the problems in
the Netherlands were published leads to the question of how
often these tests need to be repeated. An example of one of
these aspects, distance, will be taken into account in Section
VI where we define requirements. The other factors can be
considered as important future work.
III. SIDE-CHANNELS
The term ”side-channel” refers to an implementation-
specific form of information leakage, usually from an im-
plementation of a cryptographic algorithm, in a manner not
considered in the data flow model of the implementation [8].
This leakage can allow the determination of the secret key and
reconstruction of plaintext data. It is important to note that a
successful side-channel attack does not equate to a successful
break of the cryptographic algorithm, only demonstrating that
the method of implementation, which can be in software or
hardware, is not secure.
A. Side-channel cryptanalysis
There are three primary types of side-channel cryptanalysis:
timing analysis, power analysis and electromagnetic analysis,
which will be introduced in the following three subsections.
1) Timing analysis: Timing analysis first came into promi-
nence with Kocher’s work on public key algorithms that relied
on modular exponentiation [9]. The general attack relies on
the ability of an attacker to eavesdrop on the known crypto-
graphic protocol and collect time measurements of exponent
operations on several known plaintexts, the exponent being
the secret key. Individual bits of this secret key can be
guessed with high probability through comparison of time
variations that arise due to differences in the speed of modular
exponentiation calculations.
Symmetric algorithms have also been the target of timing
attacks, focussing on discrepancies in time taken for specific
operations. Bad implementations of AES have been shown
to be vulnerable to timing attacks, where certain operations
do not run in constant time, and also across networks in
certain versions of OpenSSL, where key bits were found to be
recoverable over the network itself using timing information
from the computer performing the encryption operations.
2) Power analysis: Power analysis attacks evolved from
the work done on timing attacks, with a greater emphasis on
attacking hardware implementations, especially smart cards.
Differences in power consumption during encryption opera-
tions, measured over time using power probes in conjunction
with oscilloscopes, are utilised to determine information about
the secret key [10].
Two main types of power analysis have been developed;
SPA, simple power analysis, and DPA, differential power
analysis. SPA of DES, for instance, produces a power trace
that can elucidate the information about a single encryption
operation, while DPA of DES can make use of multiple
traces to determine individual key bits by multiple guesses.
Implementations of AES have also been successfully attacked.
3) Electromagnetic analysis: Electromagnetic analysis of
cryptographic implementations derives from the techniques
used in power analysis attacks, with SEMA, simple electro-
magnetic analysis, and DEMA, differential electromagnetic
analysis, existing as electromagnetic counterparts to the dif-
ferent types of power analysis. The main difference between
electromagnetic analysis and power analysis is that in an elec-
tromagnetic attack power consumption is measured through
the detection of electromagnetic currents caused by electric
activity in the target device over time. Such an attack has
been demonstrated against implementations of DES and RSA
in smart cards [11].
B. Compromising emanations
There is one ubiquitous aspect of cryptographic imple-
mentations providing confidentiality between two users; the
data being protected must at some point be human readable.
Whether it is at the input stage, or when the plaintext is
presented on a computer display or some other readable
format, sensitive data is vulnerable to eavesdropping before
the encryption process and after the decryption process. In
effect, attacks focussing on recovering this information are
circumventing the protection offered by any cryptography in
place.
Here, surveillance style attacks can be directed against
common methods of data input and display. By targeting
devices such as computer keyboards and monitors it is possible
for an attacker to recover information through remote, passive,
observation. The most obvious way of doing so would be
by visual monitoring, performed by an attacker and standard
optical or imaging equipment, such as a telescope or a cam-
era. However, by investigating and exploiting device-specific
information leakage, there are other ways to recover sensitive
data.
The source of this leakage must come from what can be
considered ”side-channel” information, which is given out by
the target device. This information can be thought of as a
”compromising emanation”. These emanations can take the
form of any distinct signal containing leaked information from
a device, but in academic literature three distinct types are
the most published on; electromagnetic emanations, optical
emanations and acoustic emanations.
1) Electromagnetic emanations: Popularly known under
the name ”TEMPEST” or ”Tempest”; electromagnetic emana-
tions, which can occur from various electronic devices, leak
information as radio frequency emissions.
Beginning in the eighties with work demonstrating the
eavesdropping capabilities of radio receivers picking up ema-
nations from cathode ray tube (CRT) monitors [12], allowing
display reconstruction, and later from RS-232 serial data
cables, allowing binary data capture [13], electromagnetic
emanations have repeatedly been shown to be exploitable
and capable of breaking confidentiality of displayed and
transmitted plaintext data. Further development has resulted
in more advanced technique in radio signal processing being
applied to liquid crystal display (LCD) technology [14] and
touch screens [15], again allowing display reconstruction, and
PS/2 and USB keyboards, allowing remote and autonomous
keystroke logging [16].
2) Optical emanations: Attacks based on visual informa-
tion have been known as security issues for quite some
time, with ”shoulder surfing” being a common attack against
password or PIN entry. However, more powerful attacks are
possible with special equipment.
It is possible to reconstruct screen content from low resolu-
tion CRT displays by measuring diffuse light emanations using
photomultiplier tubes, without the need for line-of-sight access
[17]. Using similar equipment, it is also possible to reconstruct
data from flashing status LEDs on various types of computer
hardware, including those from an older Federal Standard-
rated cryptographic module, in plaintext [18]. Additionally,
the capture of screen content through distance imaging of re-
flected images in common everyday objects such as eyeglasses,
teapots, and even the human cornea has demonstrated that
in certain circumstances even blocking line-of-sight access to
a display may not be enough to stop sensitive information
leakage [19]. Optical eavesdropping of keyboard input has
also been demonstrated, using a consumer-grade video capture
device to relay keystrokes and using image analysis techniques
to determine the original data [20].
3) Acoustic emanations: Sound carries information in the
form of frequency, wavelength and amplitude which can be
measured by audio capturing equipment such as microphones.
Acoustic emanations cause information leakage that can be
exploited with such equipment. The most powerful attacks
presented academically have been against keyboard input, and
demonstrate the potential application of such an attack for
capturing login details and other secret information recovery.
The first attack method dealing with acoustic recognition of
keystrokes was capable of differentiating between keystrokes
through labelled acoustic signatures, and that telephone and
ATM keypads were as vulnerable to this method as com-
puter keyboards [21]. Further development on the idea of
autonomous keystroke detection came with the application
of a hidden Markov model in combination with statistical
processes based on English grammar to create an attack
methodology capable of real-time keystroke detection after
short period of training [22]. The latest methodology allowing
the reconstruction of plaintext data from acoustic emanations
involves using statistical analysis, based on estimated dis-
tance between keys on a ”QWERTY”-layout keyboard and
assumption of the use of English words, of keystrokes to
determine the most likely words being typed, in real time
with no prior training or program preparation required [23].
However, keyboards are not the only target of acoustic attacks.
Recently it has been demonstrated that dot-matrix printers
are also capable of leaking data through noise emitted during
regular operation [24]. This data allows the reconstruction of
the original printout.
IV. RELEVANCE TO EVOTING
In this section we examine how the above attacks could
be applied against eVoting machines. In general, one can
say, that attacks taking advantage of plaintext leakage are
especially relevant to eVoting systems because for a voter to
make a selection they must be able to accurately cast and
check their own vote, meaning that these processes must be
human readable. Furthermore, the parameters of vote selection
mean that voter input is constricted to a limited set of choices
which would manifest themselves as distinct signals within the
leaked information.
As the analyses presented in this section are intended to
identify potential vulnerabilities, and concrete attacks would
depend on an in-depth technical evaluation of a specific
implementation, we present the following ideas to highlight
potential targets for attack. We analyse which components
might be the most vulnerable, and present demonstrated and
published attacks to underline the extent of their applicability.
The eVoting systems chosen here represent the majority
of proposed and implemented technologies. Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting machines and additional components
that offer voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs) are
first analysed, followed by systems that make use of optical
scanners to interpret marked ballot papers. Finally, the use of
cryptography in eVoting systems is considered.
It should be noted that the papers referenced here, with
the exception of the VVSG guidelines [3], have demonstrated
these attacks on the same type of equipment as used in eVoting
machines, not against them specifically.
A. DRE voting machine with VVPATs
Let us consider a typical type of eVoting machine at a
polling station. It is not connected to any network, is capable
of only direct recording of votes through a simple interface,
such as buttons or a touch-screen, and uses a display to provide
voters with feedback of their selections. It may also have a
printer attached to it for the purposes of providing a paper
audit trail in the form of voter receipts. For sight-disabled
voters, headphones may also be attached to allow the playing
back of voter options and selections.
The application of side-channel cryptanalysis to such a
device would not be required, since it does in general not make
use of any cryptographic processes. However, the exploitation
of plaintext compromising emanations would be extremely
attractive to an attacker, since it affords a method of passively
and remotely breaking voter secrecy.
Table I gives an overview of how the three types of
compromising emanations can be directed to the most common
components of Direct Recording Electronic voting machines.
These types are explained in more detail in the following
paragraphs.
Electromagnetic emanations can come from the DRE voting
machine display, which may be cathode ray tube (CRT) or
liquid crystal display (LCD) [14]. Some implemented DREs
use touch screens for providing both display of candidates and
means to select them. These have also been demonstrated to
be vulnerable to exploitation [15]. Since displays are used to
provided voters with feedback on their selections, successful
capture of this information would provide an attacker with
confidential vote data. Electromagnetic emanations may also
come from additional selection tools such as buttons or key-
boards, against which there exist demonstrated attacks [16].
Additionally, if the printer is connected to the machine with
an RS-232 serial cable, ballot information can also be leaked
[13].
Optical emanations can be exploited from CRT screens,
using indirect diffuse light, such as that reflected from a
wall or through opaque material, to reconstruct an image
of the screen [17]. Screen capture can also be achieved
through the imaging of reflections in voters’ eyeglasses and
other reflective objects in the immediate surroundings [19].
Autonomous reconstruction of keyboard input [20] can also be
applied against voter interaction with DRE machine keypads.
Acoustic emanations can come from voter input with se-
lection tools. Keyboards, keypads and buttons have all been
shown to create identifiable acoustic signatures that allow
the reconstruction of input information [21]–[23], and these
attacks can be directed towards the selection tools provided
by DRE voting machines. Additionally, dot-matrix printers
have demonstrated susceptibility to acoustic eavesdropping,
allowing reconstruction of the printed data [24]. This could
be used to reconstruct printed ballots. Additionally, the head-
phones used by sight-disabled voters may leak information if
set at too high a volume [3].
TABLE I
COMPONENTS OF DRE VOTING MACHINES WITH VVPATS THAT ARE POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE TO EXPLOITATION OF COMPROMISING EMANATIONS
Potentially Vulnerable Machine Component
Compromising Emanation Visual Display Unit Selection Peripheral Ballot Printer Headphones
Electromagnetic Yes [12], [14], [15] Yes [15], [16] Yes [13] -a
Optical Yes [17], [19] Yes [20] - -
Acoustic - Yes [21]–[23] Yes [24] Yes [3]
a(-) denotes no examples to be found in the available literature.
TABLE II
COMPONENTS OF OPTICAL SCANNER BASED SYSTEMS THAT ARE POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE TO EXPLOITATION OF COMPROMISING EMANATIONS
Potentially Vulnerable System Component
Compromising Emanation Scanner-PC Cable LEDs on Network Port Paper Ballot at Scanner
Electromagnetic Yes [13] -a -
Optical - Yes [18] Yes [19]
a(-) denotes no examples to be found in the available literature.
B. Optical scanner based systems
With eVoting systems based on optically scanned ballot
papers, other potential vulnerabilities may exist. There are
many methods for implementing optical scanner based sys-
tems, including approaches where the scanning is performed
during the tallying phase, or where the scanner stores the vote
in an integrated internal electronic storage medium. Here we
consider a simple and generic system where voters are required
to scan in their completed ballot papers at the polling station,
using an optical scanner which then transfers their selections
to a computer and interprets the marks on the ballot. Typically
such systems do not employ any cryptography, but some
possibilities exist for attacks exploiting plaintext information
leakage. Table II gives an overview of potential vulnerabilities
of optical scanner based systems.
Electromagnetic emanation leakage may be present from the
connection between the scanner and the PC to which ballot
images are saved, if this connection is made with an RS-232
serial cable [13]. This would allow recovery of each ballot
image as it is scanned and saved. Regarding optical emanation
leakage, the ballot paper may be inadvertently visible when
placed into the scanner from being transported from the private
polling booth with long distance imaging techniques, and non-
direct imaging techniques [19], being used to recover ballot
information. One other possibility is that one or more scanners
may be connected to a computer with network cables. Here,
status light emitting diodes (LEDs) on an ethernet port could
leak the ballot image while being scanned and sent back to
the PC, provided that the LED can be defined as a Class III
LED as described in [18].
Although it is possible that the actual scanning components
of commercially available optical scanners give out exploitable
electromagnetic emanations, no published work is available
on this topic, and an attack against the scanner itself must be
considered as speculation.
C. eVoting systems that use cryptography
In addition to the threat of compromising emanations men-
tioned above which are applicable to display, selection, print-
ing or scanning devices, attacks using side-channel cryptanal-
ysis must be considered for cryptographic implementations
in eVoting systems. However, it should be noted that the
existence of vulnerabilities would depend on the concrete
implementation of the system. Therefore, we only focus on
one example: the Bingo Voting system, where cryptography
can be used to generate random numbers, used for vote secrecy
and verifiability [25].
In Bingo Voting, a system that makes use of random
numbers generated at the polling booth in secret to allow
only the voter to determine their selected candidate among
other pre-generated random numbers, which act as ”dummy”
votes, on a ballot receipt [25]. This allows the voter to
verify that their vote has been interpreted by the system
correctly by checking the receipt on a public bulletin board.
Since knowledge of the poll booth random number allows
the finding of the selected candidate on the voters’ receipt,
any leakage of this number reveals their selection and breaks
vote secrecy. In this case, the implementation of the random
number generator would determine vulnerability to attack and
the application of side-channel cryptanalysis might be relevant.
Here, key recovery from a cryptographically based pseudoran-
dom number generator would allow the determination of each
following number, allowing an attacker to gain knowledge of
each secret random number for all following voters. However,
the existence of these vulnerabilities completely depends on
the specifics of the implementation, and none of the above
suggestions are intended to cast doubt on the security of the
proposed protocols, but are only intended to highlight how
vulnerabilities in the implementation of eVoting machines in
an eVoting system might affect election security as a whole.
V. FEASIBILITY OF ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
In this section we discuss the general feasibility of the most
relevant side-channel attacks against eVoting machines; those
that exploit compromising emanations. We also discuss the, to
be assumed, attacker potential and countermeasures proposed
in literature.
A. General feasibility
We concentrate on attacks exploiting compromising ema-
nations because they can be applied to common components
of many eVoting systems. For all the attacks presented, it is
necessary to match the captured ballot information to each
voter. This requires the ability to link each voter to the time of
their cast vote, but this kind of ”traffic analysis” can be carried
out by observing voting booth entry and exit, and creating an
association between voters and their votes in this way should
be considered trivial.
Regarding the exploitation of electromagnetic emanations,
demonstrated distances of successful information retrieval can
range from 50 metres for CRT displays in plastic casings and
10 metres for CRT displays in metal casings [12], 10 metres
for LCD displays [14], 5 metres for keyboards [16], 7 metres
for RS-232 cables [13] and 1 metre for touch screens [15].
All these attacks are achievable using widely available radio
receiver technology.
Attacks based on exploiting optical emanations, in the form
of shoulder-surfing, are generally taken into account already
with the designed privacy of polling booths mitigating most of
optical based threats. However, the suggested vulnerability of
status LEDs on scanners, practical at a distance of 10 metres
[18], and the possible exploitation of light emanations from
CRT displays, which can be realised at a distance of 50 metres
without line-of-sight access and in the right light conditions
[17], is something which is not dealt with in any security
standards. Furthermore, attacks based on exploiting reflected
images containing 10 pt font can take place from a distance
of 5 metres [19].
Acoustic emanations are a novel source of information
leakage from data input devices and dot matrix printers.
Keypad input can be reconstructed from a distance of 15
metres with a parabolic microphone, but the best results were
achieved with a microphone being placed close to the target
device [21]. For the attack against the printer, the microphone
must be within 10 centimetres of the printer [24]. However, the
current level of sophistication and miniaturisation for remotely
operated audio bugs can be used to greatly increase the range
of a practical attack.
In the future, developments in technology specific to these
emanations could increase the power of these attacks. If
autonomous collection of ballot information where possible,
the application of these attacks on a large scale would be
feasible.
B. Attacker motivation and power
Attacker motivation must also be considered. There exist
a multitude of groups opposed to the implementation of
eVoting for legally binding elections, and each will no doubt
attempt to discover vulnerabilities in any proposed system.
Some members of such groups also possess a high degree of
technical expertise and knowledge, this coupled with a strong
desire to find security holes in eVoting systems means that
systems that have not undergone a thorough and open security
analysis prior to deployment are guaranteed to be given a
trial by fire. This reinforces our motivation and suggestion
for formalised security requirements, which would do away
with the principle of security through obscurity.
While there is some potential for such attacks to be deployed
en masse against implementations of eVoting systems, the
real power and practicality of these attacks stems from their
remote and passive properties. The surveillance capabilities
of these attacks open up avenues that are hard to predict
when designing a theoretically secure system. For instance,
in countries that are made up of an amalgamation of distinct
ethnic and political groups, and where these groups make
up the majority of distinct localities within the country, the
breaking of voter confidentiality can cause reprisals against
voters for minority groups, or provide a means of inducing
future voter coercion. Another scenario might involve targeting
polling stations where high-profile individuals, who do not
wish to disclose their political preference, are known to vote
at.
Overall, the attacks presented here should be considered
feasible as we have good reasons to assume the existence of
determined and competent attackers. Note, large scale attacks
are only possible by a group of people as it is required to
observe the polling booths to know who cast a vote on which
machine when.
C. Countermeasures
Electromagnetic emanations are taken into account by man-
ufacturers of electronic devices due to the need to comply
with emission standards for the reduction of electromagnetic
interference, published by the International Electrotechnical
Commission through CISPR standards [26], but these do not
address the existence of information leakage. Countermeasures
have been suggested and implemented, such as software font
design to reduce legible image reconstruction [27].
The techniques described above that exploit optical ema-
nations can be directed against eVoting machines in a way
that would not seem obvious when setting up a polling station
to prevent shoulder-surfing type attacks. As such, designing
countermeasures to combat this form of leakage creates a link
between information and physical security. While it would
appear to be common sense to block all line-of-sight access to
sensitive data that an attacker might possess, further thought is
required to adequately defend against methods using the more
novel forms of attack. This could include covering status lights
of auxiliary equipment [18] and using completely enclosed
poll booths to prevent reflection based attacks.
With regards to preventing acoustic emanations, the source
of such emanations from keyboards and keypads lies in their
design; the supporting plate on which all keys rest acts as a
drum, resonating with each keystroke. It has been suggested
that using a keyboard that does not rely on this, such as a
projected keyboard or touch screen would solve this issue
[21]. The most effective countermeasure for preventing leak-
age from the printer was acoustic shielding. However, other
countermeasures might include changing printer technology to
inkjet or laser printers, which were not found to be vulnerable
to the same attack [24], or implementing greater physical
security measures around the target device, preventing the
attacker from using covert audio recording equipment.
By putting forward the above countermeasures along with
the discovery of each attack, it becomes obvious that it is
possible to protect electronic voting systems against side-
channels but it is necessary to take this type of attack into
account and apply these countermeasures.
VI. SIDE-CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR EVOTING
As a crucial component of the overall security of an
eVoting system, side-channel security for the guarantee of
confidentiality must be formalised and integrated in existing
requirement documents. Therefore, we first analyse existing
security evaluation standards’ applicability for this purpose.
After having shown that the Common Criteria fits best we
provide a short introduction to the Common Criteria and define
afterwards our requirements in the Common Criteria language.
A. Existing standards
Here we present the two relevant security evaluation stan-
dards, namely FIPS and Common Criteria, and analyse if they
can be used to define security requirements for side-channels
in eVoting machines.
a) FIPS 140-3: The draft of FIPS 140-3, the Federal
Information Processing Standard 140-3 [28] which standard-
ises security for cryptographic modules, mentions the forms
of side-channel cryptanalysis presented in Section III-A. FIPS
140-3 is essentially the first step towards formal security
requirements for protection against side-channel attacks. De-
veloped by NIST, the National Institute for Standards and
Testing, the standard represents the work of a central body
beginning to define security requirements for side-channel
cryptanalysis and providing a framework for evaluation and
certification.
Out of 4 levels of security, assurance ascending with
number, side-channel resistance is required for levels 3 and
4. The actual requirements in the document specify that
the validating authority, in other words the organisation that
performs the evaluation, shall determine that the device’s
security is not compromised by timing analysis, power analysis
and electromagnetic analysis. Furthermore, it requires that
documentation of the countermeasures and their effectiveness
are provided. Finally, the effectiveness of the countermeasures
will be specified by the validating authority.
FIPS 140-2 [29] Level 3 has already been applied to the sys-
tem T-DRE for the purposes of implementing countermeasures
for protecting against physical manipulation. The system was
developed and implemented in Brazil for the 2010 presidential
elections [30]. The machine makes use of trusted platform
modules and corresponding cryptographic analysis to provide
extra assurance for machine and election integrity.
b) Common Criteria: The purpose of Common Crite-
ria is to define a method for the semi-formal definition of
evaluation criteria for IT security [31]. In its most basic
form, a designer or vendor of the TOE (Target of Eval-
uation) produces documentation in the form of a Security
Target (ST). This addresses threats, assumptions and security
objectives. Furthermore, predefined requirements, published
in the Common Criteria Security Functionality Requirements
Catalogue, are matched to the defined threats, assumptions
and security objectives. These are called Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs), which specify secure functionality of
the TOE. Generally, SFRs have dependencies, where one or
more defined SFR are required to be met for the purposes of
another SFR. As a complete document, the Security Target is
then used by the evaluating authority to ensure that the TOE
performs as stated.
There exists an extension of the Common Criteria Security
Functional Requirements catalogue that takes into account
emanations that cause information leakage; FTP EMSEC [32].
FTP here denotes these requirements falling under the area of
Trusted Paths/Channels. This provides a basis for formalising
requirements based on side-channel cryptanalysis and compro-
mising emanations within the Common Criteria methodology.
The details of the FPT EMSEC.1 requirement family
are given here, and there are no dependencies for the two
requirements.
FPT EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions]
in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list
of types of user data].
FPT EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are
unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of
connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of
TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
It constitutes two parts, the first part requiring that the TOE,
which in our case would be an eVoting machine, does not
create emanations that leak information that is wished to be
protected. The second part requires that the TSF (TOE Security
Functions), which would be all countermeasures deployed,
adequately prevents the leakage of sensitive information.
c) Comparison: The FIPS standard only provides defi-
nitions relevant to side-channel cryptanalysis. For the specific
forms of compromising emanations discussed in Section III-B,
which are even more relevant to eVoting than side-channel
cryptanalysis, the Common Criteria can be used to address
both side-channel cryptanalysis, as has been demonstrated for
power analysis [32], and compromising emanations with the
use of the FTP EMSEC.1 requirement family, an extension
to the Security Functional Requirement Catalogue. A further
benefit is that the use of Common Criteria for the purposes
of eVoting machine evaluation has already occurred, as the
Digital Pen Voting system has been analysed according to the
Common Criteria1. Correspondingly, there already exists some
familiarity with the application of the Common Criteria to
eVoting. Therefore, we have decided to apply the Common
Criteria method for the definition of security requirements.
B. Defining requirements with Common Criteria
In the following subsections, we give an overview of the
procedure for defining security requirements with Common
Criteria.
The first step is to formulate assumptions and threats that
deal with the specific vulnerabilities that should be taken into
consideration. In the case of defining these components to
address side-channels, it is necessary to look at the specifics
of each published attack for each vulnerability. We can draw
assumptions and threats from such details, as effective dis-
tances for successful attacks and type of equipment needed.
With these details, objectives can then be formulated for that
specific type of attack.
In the next step, security objectives are deduced from
these threats and assumptions. Predefined Security Functional
Requirements, published and openly available on the Common
Criteria website as Common Criteria Part 2: Security Func-
tional Requirements [31], are then chosen and included along
with the security objectives.
One difficulty with this is that in the main requirements
catalogue, there exist no mention of emanations or emissions.
However, extensions to the catalogue exist, and one of these,
the FPT EMSEC.1 Family, addresses the existence of side-
channels. This extension has been used in Security Targets for
products and devices where side-channels are an important
consideration, such as smart cards [32].
A Protection Profile is a user generated set of security
requirements. It allows third-parties to formalise security re-
quirements to be taken into consideration by designers for
incorporation into a Security Target. Since these requirements
can be made in an implementation-independent manner, it is
preferable to define a Protection Profile in sensible contexts
like eVoting machines first and later base an evaluation of a
concrete product on such a Protection Profile.
C. Example requirements
Here we define an example set of assumption, threat,
security objective, and corresponding Security Functional Re-
quirements, denoted as A, T, O and SFR respectively. These
definitions are intended to act as a demonstration of how
1Note, side-channels have not been addressed in this Common Criteria
evaluation.
published attack methodologies can be used to formulate
security requirements. As we only provide examples, more
work needs to done to formalise security requirements that
comprehensively cover side-channels in relation to eVoting.
Other requirements can be defined in the same way, i.e. taking
available information from published attacks and using it to
identify attack capabilities. For now, there exists the one SFR
extension described above, so each assumption, threat and
objective would be defined in the same way as the following
example, for the formulation of actual security functional
requirements.
Note, the requirements we propose do not intend any
defined requirements to form their own Protection Profile.
Instead, we suggest that these requirements form part of
more comprehensive Protection Profiles like the existing one
for the Digital Election Pen [33], that would look at security
for one type of eVoting machine. The proposed requirements
could also easily be integrated in existing Security Targets.
The examples for the operational environment are as
follows:
A.ElectromagneticEmanations.AttackerDistance
The eVoting machine, TOE, is secure from physical
manipulation, and is operated by voters in an environment
that can be kept secure, i.e an attacker cannot initiate an
attack without being detected, to a distance of 10 metres
around the machine.
Application Note. The distance of 10 metres, the maximum
range demonstrated in the literature for an attack on LCD
monitors or CRT monitors in metal casings, takes into account
a reasonably sized polling station. Note, whatever distance
is selected, it needs to be ensured that the placement of the
machine within the station allows a secure environment to be
maintained.
T.ElectromagneticEmanations.DisplayLeakage
Display technologies (CRTs and LCDs), used to display
voters’ selections back to them during the vote casting
process, leak electromagnetic emanations in the radio
frequency spectrum. The emanations are eavesdropped by an
attacker, breaking vote confidentiality. The attacker is able
to link votes to each voter by having additional information
about who cast their vote when, i.e. timing information from
observation.
Correspondingly, the example security objective is:
O.ElectromagneticEmanations.DisplayLeakage
The eVoting machine, TOE, shall not leak electromagnetic
emanations, containing information that can be used to the
deduce the cast vote, that can be received from 10 metres
away or more.
Based on this security objective the following Security
Functional Requirement can be deduced:
FPT EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [electromagnetic emanations] in
excess of [a distance of 10 metres] enabling access to [ballot
information, generated by the machine]
FPT EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [attackers] are unable to use the
following interface [emanations in the radio frequency
spectrum received with radio receiver technology] to gain
access to [ballot information]
Rationale
The SFRs chosen here address all aspects of the security
objective above. The security objective addresses the
assumption and the threat defined above.
With this example, we demonstrate how threats and as-
sumptions found in the available literature can be used as the
basis for formulating security objectives, and can be met by
predefined SFRs. This needs to be extended for the other types
of side-channels mentioned above.
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We have seen how implementation-specific attacks can
defeat certain types of cryptographic and physical security
measures. Indeed, some of the attacks discussed here are
especially relevant to the simple, plaintext, data input and
output of vote casting present in many eVoting systems.
We have shown how potential avenues exist for information
leakage and that electromagnetic, optical and acoustic emana-
tion exploitation attacks are applicable against current eVoting
system technologies. All these attacks have been demonstrated
in the available literature as functional and practical. They
have shown that the use of consumer-grade equipment, such
as displays, keypads, printers and scanners, enables attacks
exploiting compromising emanations, and also allows the
applicability of such attacks across distinct eVoting systems
that make use of those same types of equipment. Attacks
exploiting electromagnetic emanations having already been
successfully directed against DRE voting machines, and with
this in mind, we have called for an improvement of this
situation through the formalisation of the security threats that
these types of attacks present.
The clearest direction for future work lies in the need for
defining a complete list of security requirements for addressing
side-channel vulnerabilities of eVoting machines. For example,
assumptions taking other aspects of feasibility, such as the size
of required attack equipment need to be defined. To ensure that
the list is exhaustive, we will use techniques such as attack
trees, which would allow the methodical development of a
complete list of threats.
Furthermore, once work on defining requirements for poll
booth eVoting machines has been completed, there may be
interesting future work in seeing how these security require-
ments could be extended to cover remote eVoting systems.
In such systems such as internet voting, leakage might occur
from a voter’s PC or at the voting server, environments that
would require different security requirements to be enforced.
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